The Great Interregnum of the Holy Roman Empire
- 18 June 2026
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Overview
After Frederick II’s death, the Holy Roman Empire entered the Great Interregnum, a crisis of contested kingship and weakened coordination. The problem was not simply the absence of an emperor, but a system rebalancing legitimacy, papal influence, princely power, and territorial rule.
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When the Imperial Centre Lost Its Grip
Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor
When Frederick II (r.1220–50) died in December 1250, he left no adult heir to secure his dynasty. His only son, King Conrad IV of Germany (and Sicily), was away fighting in Italy and died in 1254, leaving the Hohenstaufen line extinct. Thus began the so-called Great Interregnum (1250–1273) – a term coined by 19th-century historians for this age of imperial vacancy. In reality, it was not a time without rulers, but a prolonged contest among rival kings and claimants. Papal-backed anti‑kings (Henry Raspe and William of Holland) had already opposed Frederick’s son. After their deaths, a struggle broke out between two foreign candidates (Richard of Cornwall and Alfonso X of Castile) and local princes. Throughout, the papacy waged its own power play to exclude Hohenstaufen influence. Meanwhile, the Empire’s princes (dukes, counts, bishops, and even cities) took advantage of the turmoil to increase their autonomy. By the time Rudolf of Habsburg was elected king in 1273, the centre of authority had shifted: imperial power now rested on alliances with territorial lords, and a new political equilibrium was emerging.
Interregnum (definition): In English usage, an interregnum is an “interval between reigns” with no official sovereign. In the Holy Roman Empire, however, 1250–1273 saw multiple rival Kings of the Romans, each claiming authority. Early sources often speak simply of “no firm king” (sine rege) or dynastic gap, but modern historians emphasise that this was a contestation rather than an absence.
What “Interregnum” Means, and Why It Mattered
Historically, the label “Great Interregnum” is a retrospective term; contemporaries did not use it. 19th-century scholars applied it to a “dark age” of weak monarchy, but recent research shows it was more complex. It marked both the end of centralised Hohenstaufen authority and the rise of princely independence. Frederick II’s policies had already decentralised Germany – he granted princes judicial and fiscal rights and rarely governed directly. His long absences in Italy further lowered the emperor’s profile in Germany. After his death, no strong successor emerged. Rather than a “kingless” era, there were several kings:
- Henry Raspe (r.1246–47): The Thuringian landgrave was elected anti‑king (nominally to depose Conrad IV) at Pope Innocent IV’s request in 1246.
- William II of Holland (r.1247–56): A West German count, elected by the papal party in 1247 after Henry’s death.
- Richard of Cornwall (r.1257–72) and Alfonso X (r.1257–75): Foreign princes elected in a split double election of 1257. Richard was crowned, and Alfonso largely stayed in Spain.
Each king’s rule was partial. Chroniclers lamented that the realm was “nearly without a prince” and torn by rival factions. As Martin Kaufhold notes, it was not a leaderless void, but “a time of competing kings often far removed from the empire” – Richard of Cornwall had “little influence on local developments”. Thus, historians now see the interregnum as a structural rebalancing: the imperial kingship weakened while territorial rulers (lay and clerical) asserted themselves.
King of the Romans: In the Empire, the elected monarch was usually styled King of the Romans (Rex Romanorum) until his coronation by the Pope. This title, first used in the 12th century, emphasized continuity with ancient Rome. During the interregnum, both Richard of Cornwall and Alfonso X were styled “King of the Romans” after election (e.g. Richard’s 1257 coronation in Aachen), though neither received an imperial coronation.
The Destabilizing Force of Contested Kingship
The 1250–1273 period was defined by contested elections and shifting allegiances. In 1246–47, Pope Innocent IV actively deposed Frederick’s heir Conrad and sought substitute kings. Thuringian Landgrave Henry Raspe was “chosen as papal‑backed anti‑king” by leading clerics, and with papal funds, he even defeated King Conrad in battle at Frankfurt (Aug 1246). Henry died in Feb 1247, and soon the papacy anointed William II of Holland in his place. William was accepted by much of northern Germany and the Rhenish League of cities. Both Conrad and William claimed the throne: Conrad returned from Italy in 1247 and fought William, but the German lands were split.
After Conrad’s death (1254) and William’s death (1256), the struggle briefly paused, but then two foreign claimants entered. In 1257, a small electoral coalition engineered a double election: Richard of Cornwall (brother of Henry III of England) was elected by Cologne, Mainz, and others; three months later, Alfonso X of Castile was chosen by Trier, Saxony and some of the same princes. Each bribed or won over enough electors (Richard famously “bought” four votes) to claim legitimacy. Richard was crowned in Aachen and returned home; Alfonso never set foot in Germany. Both kings appealed to the Pope, resulting in Urban IV’s 1263 bull Qui coelum, which bluntly assumed the seven electors had exclusive rights to choose the king.
These rival kingdoms were inherently unstable. Princes deliberately chose outsiders (a passive English count, a Spanish king) as compromises, hoping neither would threaten their own autonomy. But with no forceful ruler to impose order, regional conflicts festered. For example, Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, after crowning William, secretly conspired (1254) to depose him in favour of King Ottokar II of Bohemia. Only Pope Alexander IV’s warning shut down that plot. In the absence of a decisive emperor, German nobles repeatedly took matters into their own hands: for instance, Duke Albert of Saxony and other princes imprisoned Duke Henry XIII of Lower Bavaria when he refused to yield to the Hohenstaufen cause.
The 1257 Election
Archbishop Konrad of Cologne induced four electors to choose Richard of Cornwall, “using the gifts and assurances” of the English prince to secure their votes. Three months later, a rival faction of four elected Alfonso X, “to strengthen his foothold in Italy”. Neither king could enforce his claim: Richard visited Germany only four times, Alfonso never; both were distracted by home turmoil. In effect, the election was a constitutional stalemate, and the papacy’s Qui coelum quietly accepted that only the prince-electors had authority to decide, foreshadowing later reforms.
Regalia: “Regalian” rights were the traditional privileges of the king, including minting coins, operating tolls, and granting market or town charters. Frederick II and his son Henry (VII) had renounced such rights in some territories to win support. In 1220 Frederick renounced castle-building, coinage, and tolls in the lands of ecclesiastical princes. In 1231 Henry (VII) made similar concessions to secular lords. These acts meant that, by the mid-13th century, territorial princes effectively controlled many prerogatives once held by the emperor.
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Papal Influence, Rival Claimants, and Political Fragmentation
The papacy played an outsized role in this period. Popes Innocent IV and Alexander IV sought to crush the Hohenstaufen and install pliant kings. They subsidised and promoted anti‑kings (Henry Raspe and William), and even formally forbade the electors from choosing another Hohenstaufen. As Britannica notes, “Pope Alexander IV forbade the election of a Hohenstaufen but interfered no further”, effectively ceding the decision to self-interested German princes. Those princes indeed acted “out of self-interest”: they feared any strong emperor and preferred weaker foreigners.
Once the double election of 1257 occurred, popes Gregory X and Urban IV played more passive roles. Both Richard and Alfonso sought papal confirmation, and Urban’s bull Qui coelum (1263) simply took their rival claims as a fait accompli, asserting that only the seven electors had the power to choose (thereby excluding any papal veto). Thus, the papacy acknowledged that Germany’s constitutional fate was now in secular hands. Meanwhile, the rival kings had virtually no control over Italy or the wider empire; indeed, they often plotted with (or against) the Pope for their own aims. Urban IV hoped to mobilise these kings for crusades, but neither achieved lasting unity.
The fragmentation of authority went further: ecclesiastical princes, archbishops and bishops frequently acted as territorial lords. They administered vast domains and even engaged in warfare. For example, in 1259, the Bishop of Treves and the Archbishop of Trier took joint action to enforce toll rights on the Moselle River after years of royal neglect. (In that charter, they appealed to King Richard to confirm their rights, underscoring that the actual power resided with local lords in the king’s absence.) In short, as central control waned, both clergy and secular nobility pursued independent policies.
Why Princes Gained Ground
One of the most significant effects of the Great Interregnum was the rise of territorial princes, dukes, margraves, counts, and prince-bishops, at the expense of imperial authority. Several factors converged to favour them. First, the decline of Hohenstaufen influence created a power vacuum. As Britannica observes, the rapid alternation of weak kings “created favourable conditions for the territorial princes… to gain power”. Many of these princes had already received concessions from the Hohenstaufen. Frederick II and his son Henry had bought support by granting crown lands and privileges. In 1220, Frederick granted key royal estates in the Rhineland and Thuringia to princes, and renounced his rights to build castles, mint coins, and levy tolls in their territories. This set a precedent: by the mid-13th century, the princes were virtually free to fortify their regions and raise revenues on their own terms. A useful summary from Britannica:
“Frederick II had purchased the support of the princes with lavish grants of crown lands… In 1220 he… renounced his regalian rights of building castles, issuing coinage, and imposing tolls on merchandise in their territories. Thereafter the direct action of royal authority was virtually precluded in the princely domains. The princes were at liberty to multiply castles and toll stations, establish mints… and settle all judicial cases…”.
Thus, even before 1250, the ground was shifting. During the interregnum, this trend accelerated. With no imperial army to restrain them, princes reclaimed or expanded lands. For example, the Bohemian king Ottokar II (though not a German prince, he was a major landholder) took advantage of the vacuum to seize the March of Austria in 1253 and later Styria. In 1282 (shortly after Rudolf’s rise), those duchies were confirmed to Rudolf’s sons, permanently elevating the Habsburgs; again showing how territorial gains of the 1250s shaped the future. Simultaneously, second-tier nobles asserted autonomy: petty lords erected castles, minted coins, and even raised private armies.
Urban centres (cities and towns) also used the chaos to claim liberties. Merchants’ and craftsmen’s communities leveraged the lack of royal oversight to codify town laws (Stadtrecht) and form leagues for mutual defence. Notably, the Rhenish League of Cities, an alliance of wealthy Rhine towns, threw its weight behind William of Holland in 1254. This exemplified how cities became political players. In short, the Great Interregnum entrenched Territorialism: the princes and cities learned they could govern themselves, and kings were too weak or absent to stop them.
Rhenish Cities
In 1254, the Rhineland urban league declared for King William against rival claimants. The Britannica notes, “further support came in 1254, from the Rhenish League of Cities”. These cities (including Cologne, Mainz, and others) had prospered under the Hohenstaufen but resented royal taxes. During the interregnum, they negotiated town charters and raised militias. Over time, such cities would form recurring alliances (later the Hanseatic League) that owed little to imperial policy.
Prince-Electors: By the 13th century, only seven princes had a formal vote in the royal election: three ecclesiastical (the Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier) and four secular (the King of Bohemia, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Duke of Saxony, and the Margrave of Brandenburg). These electors dominated politics. During the interregnum, they guarded their privileges jealously. They often shifted alliances (Otto II of Bavaria counted himself elector of Saxony, for example). Crucially, Qui coelum (1263) tacitly confirmed that these seven held “the exclusive right of election”.
Rudolf I and the New Dynastic Horizon
Rudolf I of Habsburg / Austria
After more than two decades of uncertainty, the interregnum finally ended with the election of Rudolf I of Habsburg in 1273. By then, all major dynasties had failed to establish lasting rule. Pope Gregory X, concerned to unite Christendom for a crusade, urged the German princes to choose a “German” candidate rather than a foreigner. In Frankfurt (Sept 1273), they picked Rudolf, a relatively obscure Swabian count. He had no power base in Germany; indeed, the princes preferred someone they could control. Rudolf’s election was a compromise: as Britannica explains, he “lacked the strength to regain the crown domains the electors had usurped during the Great Interregnum”.
Rudolf immediately set out to consolidate power. His chief rival was Ottokar II, who still held Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. From 1276 to 1278, Rudolf waged war against Ottokar, eventually defeating him at the Battle of Marchfeld (1278). By 1282, the duchies of Austria and Styria were declared vacant and granted to Rudolf’s sons. This was a dramatic shift: the Habsburgs, once minor counts, now controlled the richest lands in the eastern Empire. These acquisitions “placed the Habsburgs in the first rank of princes and lent impetus to the geographic shift of the empire to the east and south”. (However, Rudolf’s power still depended on the electors’ consent; they blocked him from securing hereditary succession for his son.)
Rudolf’s reign (1273–91) marks the start of a new dynastic phase, but it also underscores the interregnum’s legacy. He was the first of the major “lesser” families (Habsburg, Luxemburg, Wittelsbach) to sit on the throne. He accepted that he could not restore the old crown estates; most imperial lands had been parcelled out to princes. Instead, he used marriage alliances (his children married into powerful houses) and legal doctrine (the doctrine of majority election) to strengthen his line. In effect, the Empire now functioned as a princely league with a king-figurehead, rather than a centralised monarchy.
How the Empire Learned to Live with Decentralization
By 1273, the Empire had adapted to its new reality. The interregnum had taught all parties that strong emperor-level governance was unsustainable unless kings shared power. Princes had secured so many autonomous rights that an imperial campaign to reclaim them would have sparked rebellion. Even Rudolf, though energetic, largely operated by negotiation with the princes and the church rather than by force.
Institutionally, the interregnum paved the way for major constitutional changes. The chronic lack of consensus over disputed elections led to the doctrine (first asserted in 1338–39) that an election by a majority of electors was valid without papal approval. This principle was implicitly recognised during the interregnum: when Richard and Alfonso were elected by different pluralities, none could credibly appeal to a higher judge. (Urban IV’s Qui coelum simply assumed the electors’ authority.)
Moreover, the princes themselves codified their gains. The concept of territorial sovereignty, that each prince’s domain was essentially a private hereditary estate, took firmer hold. Princes began holding their own courts, armies, and foreign policies (a shift noted by scholars like Wilson and Arnold). An important innovation was arbitration: with no king to appeal to, nobles often settled disputes through negotiated settlements or local courts. (For example, Peter Gerlach’s 1260 treaty partitioning the County of Cleves between heirs was confirmed by the Archbishop of Cologne rather than the king.)
In summary, the Empire “learned to live with” its fragmentation. Royal letters and charters from the 1260s often bear witness to just how limited the kings’ actual power was; frequently, they confirm grants made years before, or authorise taxes at a prince’s request, rather than initiating action on their own. In practice, governance was a patchwork: ducal councils, episcopal capitularies, city ordinances and noble feoffments. This diffusion of power diminished hopes of central reform; instead, 14th-century rulers worked within the post-interregnum order.
Golden Bull of 1356: This landmark constitution, issued by Emperor Charles IV, formalized the outcomes of the interregnum. It confirmed the seven electors as the only kings-makers, cemented majority voting, and granted the electors hereditary, indivisible control of their territories. In effect, the Golden Bull legalized many princely privileges gained during 1250–73 (e.g. control over coinage and justice in their lands), and ensured that future kings would depend on princes’ consent.
Setting the Stage for 1356
The Holy Roman Empire in 1356
The experience of 1250–1273 had lasting echoes. The Empire’s political structure shifted permanently towards a consensual monarchy. By the 1350s, several trends from the interregnum were clear: imperial elections occurred amid intense bargaining, princes often cooperated to limit kings, and papal influence over the German throne had waned (the Golden Bull stipulated that only secular electors could convene the vote). Even cities, once beneficiaries of the king’s absence, now chafed at growing princely power and sought protectors (Charles IV even granted new city privileges to win support).
Charles IV himself reflected on the recurrent feuds of 1198–1273 as a “standing malady” of the Empire. In 1356, he aimed to prevent them by requiring the electors’ unanimity and majority vote rules. The interregnum had shown that disputed elections could provoke civil war (a lesson from 1273 onward); the Golden Bull tried to codify how to avoid this. However, it also froze in place the decentralisation achieved earlier. By recognising princely rights over succession, coinage, and administration, the Golden Bull implicitly acknowledged that the era of state-building emperors was over.
In short, the years 1250–1273 were a turning point: the medieval empire transitioned from a dynastic monarchy into a federation of quasi-independent states. Far from a mere interlude, this Great Interregnum was a foundational rebalancing of power, one that defined the Holy Roman Empire’s character for the next two centuries.
What This Reveals About the Empire
The Great Interregnum (1250–1273) was not simply a hiatus in imperial rule, but a complex rebalancing of medieval German politics. With no strong Hohenstaufen to maintain centralised authority, multiple kings and claimants arose, often backed by the papacy and by shifting electoral majorities. Each contested election underscored the princes’ new leverage: no candidate could prevail without substantial concessions or outright bribery. As a result, territorial dukes, counts, bishops, and cities emerged as co-governors of the realm. By the time Rudolf of Habsburg took the throne, the imperial “centre” had weakened irreversibly; kings ruled in partnership (and often in tension) with the estates. This decentralised system paved the way for later reforms (notably the Golden Bull) and ensured that, going forward, the survival of the Empire depended on the cooperation between monarch and princes. Thus, historians today understand the Interregnum not as a failure, but as a pivotal era in which the Holy Roman Empire’s constitutional order was reshaped.
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Sources
- Arnold, B. (1991). Princes and territories in medieval Germany. Cambridge University Press.
- Brady, T. A., Jr., & Head, R. C. (Trans.). (n.d.). The Golden Bull (1356). German History in Documents and Images. https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/from-the-reformations-to-the-thirty-years-war-1500-1648/the-golden-bull-1356
- Duggan, L. G. (2026, June 17). Germany: The Great Interregnum. Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/The-Great-Interregnum
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- Wilson, P. H. (2016). Heart of Europe: A history of the Holy Roman Empire. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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Luciano Anastasi
Luciano is the founder of the MedievalHistory platform and the LinkedIn History Enthusiasts Group, where he is dedicated to curating and sharing high-quality medieval history content. His goal is to engage scholars, teachers, students, and enthusiasts by fostering insightful discussions and promoting scholarly resources on topics from medieval warfare and religion to societal transformations and daily life in the Middle Ages.
Luciano is also an active book reviewer, focusing on academic publications related to medieval history. He recently collaborated with Yale University Press to review forthcoming medieval history titles, aiming to deepen educators' and researchers' understanding of the period. Alongside his history endeavors, he has over 40 years of experience in IT leadership roles across various industries, including the public sector, banking, insurance, airlines and consulting, and has contributed to United Nations projects.
With a Master of Arts in Business Process Management, Luciano combines his expertise in IT strategy and governance with his passion for medieval history. He leverages technology to bridge the academic community and the wider public, making historical scholarship more accessible through engaging online content.
